

Fung,
Gods,
&
Modern Man

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I

The Collective Unconscious

In the realm of psychology, the present century has been characterized by important research on the layers of the human psyche we call the unconscious, on the methods of dealing with it, and on the relation between mental health and the contents of the unconscious psyche. Nobody denies the existence of consciousness, because everybody possesses certitude of his own. But in the literature concerning this subject, consciousness remains a vague concept, and so does unconsciousness. Aristotle seems to relate consciousness to knowledge, for consciousness is the awareness immanent in cognitive acts, not exclusively those cognitive acts ordained to the knowledge of external objects, but any human acts of which we are aware. There is not only consciousness of thinking, but there is also consciousness of feeling, of anxiety, of suffering, as well as other vital phenomena. Consciousness is a special kind of reflective knowledge which is obtained by the mere perception of the activity of human functions. The acts may be of different kinds, but the awareness is a common cognitive perception underlying all of them. Not every vital act is conscious, as, for instance, sleep; but the vital conscious acts are such on account of the special cognitive awareness which grasps their existence by means of their activity. For example, we are conscious of suffering because we perceive the existence of human vital acts connected with it.

Jung identifies consciousness with the relation between the ego—which he defines as a complex of representations which constitutes the centrum of the field of consciousness—and the psychic contents—an inward perception of the objective life

process.¹ Thus, he points out the intimate connection of consciousness with the process of life manifested by immanent vital acts, whose perception constitutes the essential feature of consciousness.

Unconscious phenomena, however, are so little related to the ego that most people do not hesitate to deny their existence outright. Nevertheless, Jung says, there is abundant evidence showing that consciousness is far from covering the psyche in its totality. Many things occur semi-consciously, and a great many entirely unconsciously. The unconscious thus embraces the totality of all psychic phenomena that lack the quality of consciousness.² Hence we may say that the unconscious embraces the totality of the life processes existing in man but not perceived by knowledge, because knowledge is the necessary prerequisite for consciousness.

Jung and Freud hold different conceptions of the unconscious; in fact, these differences led them to a final break. For Jung, the unconscious is composed of two parts which should be distinguished from one another: (1) One contains the forgotten material, and the subliminal impressions and perceptions which have little energy to reach consciousness. In addition, it also contains all psychic contents incompatible with the conscious attitude—elements which appear morally or intellectually inadmissible, and are repressed on account of their incompatibility. This is a more or less superficial layer of the unconscious, and it closely corresponds to Freud's conception of it.³ (2) There is yet a deeper layer called impersonal, universal, collective, and common to all men, even though it expresses itself through personal consciousness. Its contents are not personal; they do

not belong to any individual alone, but to the whole of mankind. Some modes of behavior are the same everywhere, identical in all men. The collective unconscious is a common psyche of a suprapersonal kind whose contents are not acquired during the individual's life time.⁴

For Jung, consciousness and unconsciousness represent two stages in the process of man's evolution. Man evolves from animal, and consciousness from unconsciousness. Thus, the unconscious is, historically speaking, before consciousness and the mother of it: "Consciousness grows out of the unconscious psyche, which is older than it, and which goes on functioning together with it, and even in spite of it."⁵ Just as the body has its evolutionary history and shows clear traces of the various evolutionary stages, Jung says, so too does the psyche. The collective unconscious is made up of two related although different contents, namely, archetypes and instincts.

I. Archetypes

The term *archetype*, Jung says, occurs as early as Philo-Judaicus with reference to the *Imago Dei* (God image) in man. Jung actually borrowed the idea of archetypes, however, from Saint Augustine, who speaks of "principle ideas" which are themselves not formed, but contained in the divine understanding. These principle ideas can be translated literally as archetypes.⁶

Jung uses several expressions to define archetypes: universal dispositions of the mind, a kind of readiness to produce over and

4. *Ibid.*, IX.i, 3-4, 186-187; VIII, 310-311.

5. *Ibid.*, IX.i, 281; Cf. V, 29: "[J]ust as the body has its evolutionary history and shows clear traces of the various evolutionary stages, so too does the psyche."

1. C. G. Jung, *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung*, Pantheon Books (New York), V, 540. Cf. VIII, 137; VIII, 323: "The nature of consciousness is a riddle whose solution I do not know. It is possible to say, however, that anything psychic will take on the quality of consciousness if it comes into association with the ego. If there is no such association it remains unconscious. . . . An object that happens to lie in the darkness has not ceased to exist, it is probably no different from what it is when seen by the ego." (*The Collected Works of Jung* shall be quoted as *Coll. Works*).

2. *Ibid.*, VIII, 133; IX.i, 76, 275.

3. *Ibid.*, VIII, 310-311; IX.i, 3-4, 116.

6. *Ibid.*, IX.i, 4; VIII, 136. Mircea Eliade, in *Cosmos and History* (New York, 1959), viii-ix, writes: "In using the term archetype, I neglected to specify that I was not referring to the archetype described by Professor Jung. This was a regrettable error. . . . I need scarcely say that, for Professor Jung, the archetypes are structures of the collective unconscious. But in my book I nowhere touch upon the problems of depth psychology nor do I use the concept of the collective unconscious. As I have said, I use the term archetype, just as Eugenio d'Ors does, as a synonym for 'exemplary model' or 'paradigm.'"

over again the same and similar mythical ideas; the treasure of the collective psyche, of collective ideas, of creativity; ways of thinking; of feeling, and imagining found everywhere and at all times independent of tradition; typical forms of behavior which, once they become conscious, present themselves as ideas and images; the forms, or riverbeds, along which the current of psychic life has always flowed.⁷

Although these expressions are different, the idea underlying them is always the same. The archetypes are typical and universal forms of apprehension which appear as primordial images charged with great meaning and power, images that impart a crucial influence upon our collective pattern of behavior, bringing us protection and salvation.

Existence of Archetypes—Jung has to prove the existence of contents in the unconscious that fulfill the above-mentioned definitions. Hence he has to show that certain psychic forms of apprehension have always been found in man throughout the ages. This can only be done if: (1) one observes the same thing in different individuals; (2) others confirm that they have made the same observations; and (3) the same or similar phenomena can be shown to occur in the folklore of other peoples and races and in the texts that have come down to us from earlier centuries. Jung's method, therefore, is historical. The collective pattern of behavior proper to the archetypes presupposes a certain uniformity through the ages, demonstrated only by examining historical sources and comparing these sources with observations on the pattern of behavior of contemporary man. In other words, the old and new patterns of apprehension and behavior have to show similarities and common characteristics.

How is it possible to prove this assumption? Since the collective unconscious contains material of a suprapersonal and primitive nature, it is difficult to prove its existence by observing the behavior of normal individuals who will chiefly mani-

fest the traits of their irreducible individuality. Jung, however, observes modern man and finds collective forms and ideas in the following phenomena.

1. Certain dreams. Dreams are spontaneous products of the unconscious. In order to show that dreams manifest a collective unconscious, one must look for motifs that could not possibly be known to the dreamer and still coincide with motifs known from historical sources. These dreams are valueless unless one can adduce convincing mythological parallels and the same functional meaning. For instance, Jung found in the dreams of pure Negroes living in the Southern United States motifs from Greek mythology; motifs absolutely unknown to the dreamers.⁸ Where do these dreams come from?

In *Two Essays on Analytic Psychology* he relates the case of a woman patient with a mild hysterical neurosis caused by a father complex. In the course of the treatment, the patient transferred the father image to the doctor, but she was unable to cut off the transference. Then she had the following dream: "Her father (who in reality was of small stature) was standing with her on a hill that was covered with wheat-fields. She was quite tiny beside him, and he seemed to her like a giant. He lifted her up from the ground and held her in his arms, like a little child. The wind swept the wheat fields, and as the wheat swayed in the wind, he rocked her in his arms."⁹

Jung interprets the dream as a transpersonal dream, a vision of God. The dreamer swells the human person of the doctor to suprahuman proportions making him a gigantic primordial father who is the wind (a symbol of God), and in whose protecting arms the dreamer rests like an infant. The God-image of the dreamer, who was agnostic, corresponds to an archaic conception of God but not to a conscious idea of Him. Hence the unconscious seems to contain suprapersonal acquisitions and belongings. This material, which seems to appear free from the control of our will has to be impersonal, collective.¹⁰

7. *Ibid.*, XI, 517, 519; XVI, 35; V, 228; XVI, 91; VIII, 227. Perhaps the most complete definition given by Jung is the following: "In this 'deeper' stratum we also find the a priori, inborn forms of intuition, namely the archetypes of perception and apprehension, which are the necessary determinants of all psychic processes."

8. *Ibid.*, IX, 1, 48-53; VIII, 111.

9. *Ibid.*, VII, 129.

10. *Ibid.*, VII, 125-135; XVII, 116-117.

2. The second way of testing the existence of archetypes is a technique known as "active imagination," namely, a sequence of fantasies produced by deliberate concentration. There exists a correlation between dreams and fantasies: when the fantasies are made conscious the dreams become weaker and less frequent, which proves that they stem from the same source, the unconscious. The resultant sequence of fantasies relieves the unconscious and produces material rich in archetypal images.

3. Archetypal images are also found in the dreams of early childhood, from the third to the fifth year, and chiefly in the case of mental derangement, especially schizophrenics. Insane people frequently produce combinations of ideas and symbols that could never be accounted for by experiences of their individual lives, but only by recourse to the history of the human mind, to mythological thinking. The material of neurosis, Jung insists, is always understandable in human terms and is related to the personal life of the neurotic; neurosis presupposes individual fantasies, not a loss of reality. But the material appearing in psychosis is not understandable in personal terms; schizophrenia implies a loss of reality and a reactivation of archaic fantasies and thinking that cannot be derived from the conscious mind. However, we cannot suppose, Jung insists, that certain minds (psychotics) contain elements that do not exist at all in other minds. Mental disorders manifest material of a hidden but nonetheless general condition of man.¹¹

In all these phenomena Jung finds a parallelism and similarity between the manifestation of contemporary and primitive man. The motifs and forms of the unconscious of the former, though spontaneously clothed with new dresses, are similar to the motifs and forms of mythologies of the latter, proving thus the existence of the permanent forms of apprehension and behavior through the ages that he calls archetypes.

Archetypes are crucial factors for the understanding of Jung's

11. *Ibid.*, IX:1, 278, 285; V, 140; VIII, 310-311. Frank de Creave, S.J., an anthropologist who worked in Africa, mentioned to me the following fact. Although the members of the tribe in which he worked were polytheists, those who were afflicted by schizophrenia were monotheists: a remarkable phenomenon.

philosophical structure of personality. "The more I have studied Jung's works," L. Stain says, "the more I have come to see that the essence of his greatness lies in his concept of archetypes, with their contrasting and complementary meaning."¹² And Igor Caruso writes, "Jung deserves credit for having shown that the most powerful formative forces of the soul manifest themselves in primitive images, which are common to all men (and not only to unfortunate neurotics!) namely archetypes. These are in no sense 'illusory,' but genuine functional capacities of the soul, which must be studied seriously."¹³ It is therefore important to analyze Jung's arguments leading to the formulation of this hypothesis, as well as the semantics involved in his writings.

The deeper layer of the unconscious, Jung says, is suprapersonal, collective, universal, because its content is not acquired during the individual's lifetime, and is identical in all men. It was perhaps not a happy idea to call this content collective and universal, for all the "specific" properties of man are collective and universal insofar as they are partraken by all the individuals composing the human race. These specific properties, and not their individual marks (which are as such accidental) are what make intellectual knowledge and science possible. As Bertrand Russell put it: "The only difference must lie in just the essence of individuality which always eludes words and baffles description, but which, for that very reason, is irrelevant to science."¹⁴ Therefore, the existence of a suprapersonal layer in the unconscious not only presupposes the manifestation of identical properties in all individuals, but it also presupposes the existence of primitive images, like heroes, gods, demons, dragons, monsters, spirits, etc., that usually appear in myths. "Such contents," Jung says, "are the 'mystical collective ideas' (*representations collectives*) of the primitive described by Lévy Brühl. . . . He also shows that for the primitive, collective ideas

12. L. Stein, "Language and Archetypes," *Contact with Jung*, ed. Michael Fordham (London, 1963), p. 77.

13. Igor Caruso, *Existential Psychology* (New York, 1964), p. 101.

14. Bertrand Russell, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (London, 1960), p. 61.

also represent collective feelings. By virtue of this collective feeling-value, he also terms the representations collectives 'mystiques,' since these representations are not merely intellectual, but also emotional.¹⁵ Hence the value of Jung's discovery lies mainly in the appearance in modern man of archaic elements and primitive ideas. There seems to exist in the unconscious a natural tendency to produce again and again the same primordial ideas and images, namely, the archetypes.

Naturally, all historical proofs are in general hypothetical, which is what is to be expected here. The existence of archetypes is not a conclusion derived from psychological data. Like the majority of hypotheses concerning modern science, they are suggested by empirical observations, but not derived from them. Archetypes are—using the well-known expression of Einstein—"free inventions"—free inventions of the mind of Jung, who later verified them in thousands of his patients. And yet, for a better understanding of this bold hypothesis it is significant to emphasize two facts. First, the usual manifestation of the archetypes occurs when man is placed in special psychological states, like dreams, schizophrenia, and active imagination. All these manifestations, however, presuppose a common denominator, namely, the diminution of the state of consciousness which is also the characteristic of primitive mentality. "Reduced intensity of consciousness and absence of concentration and attention, Janet's *abaissement du niveau mental*," Jung says, "correspond pretty exactly to the primitive state of consciousness in which, we must suppose, myths were originally formed. It is therefore exceedingly probable that the mythological archetypes, too, made their appearance in much the same manner as the manifestations of archetypal structure among individuals today."¹⁶ Hence both contemporary man in this special state, and archaic man share a common psychological attitude that enhances the revelation of the unconscious, which manifests itself into consciousness in a primitive way.

The archetypes, however, are not peculiar symptoms of

15. *Coll. Works*, VI, 530 (*Psychological Types*, trans. H. Godwin Baynes [London, 1926]).

16. *Ibid.*, IX, i, 155–156; Cf. IX, i, 119–120.

unusual or psychotic states. Psychotic states provide the occasion for their appearance, but they are not the causes of their existence. Primordial thinking, Jung always protests, is neither psychotic nor infantile thinking, but the normal manifestation of modern man under special conditions of consciousness.¹⁷ Moreover, though the existence of archetypes is proved by recourse to unusual states of consciousness, Jung insists that archetypes can arise spontaneously at any time, at any place, and without any outside influence.¹⁸

Second, the archetypes reveal themselves as clothed in modern dress and they appear simultaneously with conscious material. In practice it is arduous to sort out the contents belonging to the archetypes from those belonging to the conscious mind, for they are intimately interwoven. We must remember that although consciousness and unconsciousness represent different psychological functions, they are nevertheless manifestations of a unique psyche. The same phenomenon is characteristic of mythical thinking; the paradigm, the sacred story, appears clothed in a variety of concrete forms, depending on the special individual circumstances in which it emerges.

Archaic Man—In order to understand the nature of archetypes it is crucial to explore the psychology of primitive mentality, because man is still archaic, especially in his unconscious. Hence it is natural if he shows in his behavior the trait of primitive thought: "Just as our bodies still retain vestiges of obsolete functions in many of our organs, so our minds, which have

17. *Ibid.*, IX, i, 351: "The constellation of archetypal images and fantasies is not in itself pathological. The pathological element only reveals itself in the way the individual reacts to them and how he interprets them. The characteristic feature of pathological reaction is, above all, *identification with the archetype*." In IX, i, 39, Jung says: "When, therefore, the analysis penetrates the background of conscious phenomena, he discovers the same archetypal figures that activate the deliriums of psychotics. Finally, there is any amount of literature and historical evidence to prove that in the case of these archetypes we are dealing with normal types of fantasy that occur practically everywhere and not only with the monstrous products of insanity. The pathological element does not lie in the existence of these ideas, but in the dissociation of consciousness that can no longer control the unconscious." (See also VIII, 122; IX, i, 279; V, 28–29).

18. *Ibid.*, IX, i, 79.

apparently outgrown these archaic impulses, still bear the mark of the evolutionary stage we have traversed, and re-echo the dim bygone in dreams and fantasies."¹⁹ The unconscious shows countless archaic traits.

The view is not new. Mircea Eliade blames Western philosophers for refusing to recognize the experience of primitive man as important. "Better yet," he says, "the cardinal problem of metaphysics could be renewed through a knowledge of archaic ontology."²⁰ According to Nietzsche, dreams carry us back to remote conditions of human culture.²¹ And even Freud, who violently opposed the existence of Jung's collective unconscious, half admitted the archaic nature of dreams. Regarding myth, he says that it seems extremely probable that myths are distorted vestiges of the wish phantasies of whole nations, the age-long dreams of young humanity.²²

Jung regards the archaic trait of human nature as most significant. Children go through a phase of archaic thinking and feeling, and there exists a layer, the unconscious, which behaves in the same fashion as does the archaic psyche productive of myth. The unconscious brings to our present the unknown psychic life belonging to the remote past. For our purpose, however, the outstanding property of archaic man is the property which Lévy Brühl terms *participation mystique*. "For

19. *Ibid.*, V, 28. Mircea Eliade, in *Images and Symbols* (New York, 1961), pp. 34-45, says: "By directing attention to the survival of symbols and mythical themes in the psyche of modern man, by showing that the spontaneous rediscovery of the archetypes of archaic symbolism is a common occurrence in all human beings, irrespective of race and historical surroundings, depth psychology has freed the historian of religions of his last hesitations. We will give a few examples, in a moment, of this spontaneous rediscovery of archaic symbolism, and we shall see what these can teach a historian of religions."

20. Mircea Eliade, *Cosmos and History*, xii.

21. Friedrich Nietzsche, *Human All Too-Human*, trans. Helen Zimmermann, *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*, ed. Oscar Levy (New York, 1924), pp. 24-27: "This ancient element in human nature still manifests itself in our dreams, for it is the foundation upon which the higher reason has developed and still develops in every individual; the dream carries us back into remote conditions of human culture, and provides a ready means of understanding them better."

22. *Coll. Works*, V, 24.

primitive mentality," the French anthropologist says, "subject and objects are simultaneously thought and felt as homogeneous, that is to say, just as if they would share the same essence, or the same ensemble of qualities. . . . The true unity is not the individual, but the group."²³ This peculiar psychological state, Jung says, presupposes a special connection of the subject with the object to which it is bound by an immediate relation that he describes as a partial identity in mutual unconsciousness. When two persons have an unconscious relation to the same fact, they become in part identical, as often happens to children whenever they identify themselves with their parents. This property is natural and happens even now, although in rather more civilized form. Everything that is unconscious in ourselves we discover in our neighbor, and we treat him accordingly; what we combat in him is usually our own interior side.²⁴

Projection is the automatic process whereby a content unconscious to the subject transfers itself to an external object, so that it seems to belong to that object and not to the subject. Projection explains the dynamic of this partial identification, for one axiom pertaining to the psychology of the unconscious asserts that every relatively independent portion of the objective psyche has the character of personality—personality which is projected and personified upon external objects. And since everybody has complexes and independent unconscious factors, projection is a common psychic phenomenon. In primitive man, however, the mechanism of projection is even more common because his mind is yet undifferentiated and he lacks the ability to criticize himself through reflection. Hence, all his unconscious life is objectified and projected upon concrete external objects; for example, when a person is described as a leopard he supposes that he has the soul of a leopard. These identifications, brought about by projection, create a world in which man is completely contained psychologically as well as physically by the collective. Primitive man identified himself with nature and mankind; in the archaic world of primitives

23. Lévy Brühl, *Bulletin de la Société Française de Philosophie* (Paris, 1929), vol. 29, pp. 105-139.

24. *Coll. Works*, X, 65; VI, 572; X, 37, 452.

everything has the soul of mankind, the collective unconscious, for the individual has yet no soul of his own.²⁵

So much for Jung, but let us now inquire about the kind of identification corresponding to this psychological state. Victor White, in *God and the Unconscious*, after quoting the well-known Aristotelian aphorism *intelligibile in actu est intellectus a priori*, they are conscious data which presuppose a pre-conscious identity, a *participation mystique* in the deepest sense.²⁶ Why? Because, according to Aristotle, actual knowledge is identical with its object, that is to say the subject by knowing becomes the object known in a mysterious way. Expressing the same idea, Aquinas says: "The perfection belonging to one thing is found in another. This is the perfection of a knower insofar as he knows; for something is known by a knower by reason of the fact that the thing known is, in some fashion, in the possession of the knower. Hence, it is said in *The Soul* that the soul is, 'in some manner, all things,' since its nature is such that it can know all things. In this way it is possible for the perfection of the entire universe to exist in one thing."²⁷

It would be illusory, however, to believe that pure knowledge is capable of completely explaining the identification proper to primitives. Knowledge is required and yet is not enough, because emotions and the feeling of the supernatural play an essential role in primitive mentality. Hence emotions

²⁵ *Ibid.*, X, 65-67.

²⁶ Victor White, O.P., *God and the Unconscious* (Cleveland, 1965), p. 118.
²⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate*, q. 2, a. 2. Aristotle, *De Anima*, *The Works of Aristotle*, ed. W. D. Ross, trans. J. A. Smith (Oxford, 1931), 430 a, 20; 430 a, 14: "Mind is by virtue of becoming all things." The importance of consciousness and intellectual knowledge is pointed out by Jung's following words: "Man is indispensable for the completion of creation: in fact, he himself is the second creator of the world, who alone has given to the world its objective existence—without which, unheard, unseen, silently eating, giving birth, dying, heads nodding through hundreds of million of years, it would have gone on in the profoundest night of nonbeing down to its unknown end. Human consciousness created objective existence and meaning, and man found his indispensable place in the great process of being" (*Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston [New York, 1963], p. 256).

and feelings make the mystical identification a reality. "Love implies a certain complacency of the lover for the thing loved. . . . Likeness, properly speaking, is the cause of love, for the very fact that men are alike having, as it were, one form, makes them to be, in a manner, one in that form. Hence the affection of one tends to the other, as being one with him; and he wishes good to him as to himself."²⁸ Thus, likeness, similarity, seems to underlie the mystic unity of primitives, because as their unconscious lacks differentiation it has to be everywhere and in everybody similar, alike. Therefore the unity of the collective unconscious, equally shared by everybody, produces a unity and complacency among the members of the tribe, and by projection also with nature. Upon this unity follows the partial identification of affections which is the essential trait of Lévy Bruhl's mystical participation. With Aristotle we can say that through knowledge man overcomes the limitation proper to his nature by sharing the perfection of other forms. But through love we overcome the division to which created nature is subjected.²⁹ Especially the primitive and the mystic feel the solidarity with mankind and nature, the former through the unity of the collective unconscious and the common strong feelings of the supernatural; the latter through the experimental knowledge of contemplation, which sees all the universe as the mirror of the perfections of God.

At the end of his life, Lévy Bruhl abandoned his views, and regarded the prelogical state of primitives as "an hypothesis inadequately founded"; primitives share the logic of our own. He also denied the existence of any law of participation. "Although there is not law," he says, "it is a fact that the primitive is often possessed by the feeling of participation of identity with nature and the supernatural, with which he enters in contact."³⁰

²⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol.*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, I-II, q. 27, aa. 1 and 3; *Ibid.*, q. 25, a. 2 ad 2: ". . . there is also an affective union, consisting in an aptitude or proportion, insofar as one thing, from the very fact of its having an aptitude for an inclination to another, partakes of it: and love betokens such a union. . . ."

²⁹ Aristotle, *Post. Anali.*, II, ch. 6, 92 a, 20-25; Thomas Aquinas, *In Post. Anali.*, II, l. 5, n. 455.

³⁰ Lévy Bruhl, *Les Carnets de Lucien Lévy Bruhl* (Paris, 1949), pp. 77-78; Cf. pp. 60, 62.

And yet, in his writings Jung continuously borrows Lévy Bruhl's original standpoint. He does this, however, in such a personal fashion that it is difficult to say whether he expresses faithfully or not the views of the French anthropologist. Here is a sample: "We call it prelogical, because to us such an explanation seems absurdly illogical. But it seems so to us only because we start from assumptions wholly different from these of primitive man. . . . As a matter of fact, primitive man is no more logical or illogical than we are. Only his presuppositions are different, and that is what distinguishes him from us."³¹ Here Jung seems to echo something that Lévy Bruhl wrote at the end of his life:

In everything that concerns everyday experience, no essential difference is to be found between the mentality of primitives and our own. . . . Where complication arrives is in the matter of mystical experiences. How much is the extent of the difference which springs from the mystical orientation of the mentality of the primitive? Is there a logical rebound? . . . It is here that the reflection of Einstein makes us reflect for ourselves. For he shows that the intelligibility of the sensible world as ordered and ruled by science is itself without meaning. Compared to the rational world of our sciences, the mythical world is unintelligible, imaginary, cannot be real. How can it happen that, irrational as it is, with its inconsistencies and absurdities, the primitive mentality seriously accepts it as real? In looking for the answer to this question we know that the intelligibility of the rational world is itself unintelligible. Could it be that it is simply a difference of degree? A transfer from the unintelligibility of the detail to the world as it is in its totality?³²

In other words, whether the prelogical state of primitives is true or not, it affects but little the general principles entailed in the theory of archetypes.

Myth and the Unconscious—For many anthropologists of the nineteenth century, myth was the science of primitive man. But

not for many modern ones, or for Jung who asserts that primitive man is not interested in objective explanations of the obvious. Myth is mainly a psychic phenomenon that reveals the nature of the soul. "Myth explains to the bewildered human being what was going on in his unconscious and why he was held fast."³³

Therefore a myth is a symbolic expression of the inner unconscious drama of the psyche which becomes accessible to man's consciousness by way of projection, as mirrored in the events of nature. The language of nature for primitive people is not the language of nature as such, but the language of an unconscious psychic event which is projected in natural events. The projection is fundamental, but unconscious; hence, as men were unaware of this automatic mechanism, it took thousands of years to detach it from the outer object. Man thought of everything except the psyche to explain the myth, for his failure to understand the mechanism of projection. The projection of the inner life of the psyche on physical events is the key for the understanding of myth.³⁴

Primitives seldom think consciously nor do they invent myths, as moderns invent a physical theory. They simply experience them, and thoughts emerge spontaneously for myths convey vital messages to primitives. They are the psychic life of the archaic tribe, and since religion is connected with the revelation of the unconscious, a tribe mythology is its living religion whose loss, Jung says, is always and everywhere, even among the civilized, a moral catastrophe.³⁵

How is a myth formed? The explanation of the formation of myth in archaic man is a most obscure phenomenon, and it would be too much to demand absolute cogency in the thought of Jung. There are objective and subjective conditions for myth formation. Subjective, because reduced intensity of con-

33. *Coll. Works*, V, 308. Also, Bronislaw Malinowski, *Magical Science, and Religion* (New York, 1955), p. 108: "Myth . . . is not an explanation in satisfaction of a scientific interest, but a narrative resurrection of primeval reality."

31. *Coll. Works*, X, 52.

32. Lévy Bruhl, *Les Concepts de Lucien Lévy Bruhl*, pp. 70-72.

34. *Coll. Works*, IX, i, 6-7.

35. *Ibid.*, IX, i, 154.

sciousness and absence of concentration and attention correspond to the primitive state of consciousness in which myths were originated. Objective, insofar as the unconscious of primitive man possesses an irresistible urge to assimilate all outer experiences to inner psychic events. As the body adapts itself to environmental conditions, so the psyche must exhibit functional systems which correspond to regular events, and therefore a sort of parallel to regular physical occurrences. For instance, the primitive man sees the rising and setting of the sun: this is the objective happening. But the external observation must at the same time be a psychic happening, and the daily course of the sun through the sky imprints itself in the psyche in the form of an image from primordial time. The sun in its course must represent the fate of a hero who, in the last analysis, dwells nowhere but in the soul of man. The myth contains the reflection of a physical process, not an astronomical theory.³⁶

Naturally, the Jungian theory of myth does not entail a revival of Leibnitz's preestablished harmony between the external world and the cognitive powers. But it holds the principle that natural events produce in the psyche, by means of subjective reactions, a distorted image of the physical happening that when projected originates the myth. There exists a certain harmony between the physical event, the image produced by the physical event, and the myth originated by the image.

But why is the physical happening distorted in the myth? Partly on account of the strong emotional subjectivism of primordial man; partly on account of his identification with nature and objects in the external world. What happens outside happens also inside and, naturally, for primitive mentality emotions are more important than physics. Hence he registers not the physical event, but the emotional fantasies aroused by the physical event. For example, night for the archaic man symbolizes snakes and the cold breath of spirits; morning, however, represents the birth of a beautiful god. In other words, not the rain, storms, thunders, sun, and moon remain as images

36. *Ibid.*, IX, j, 156, 6; VIII, 153-154.

in the psyche, but the fantasies, the subjective reactions caused by the emotions they aroused.³⁷

Thus Jung gives a psychological interpretation to myth whose implications he was compelled to study when he discovered mythical traces in contemporary man. Against the objective explanation of myth held by many anthropologists of the nineteenth century, he attempts a subjective-objective interpretation bold and original, though not free from criticism. He discovered the connection between the contents of the unconscious and myth,³⁸ emphasizing, as George Frazer does, the solidarity of the human psyche with the natural process of nature. With Eliade he stresses the essential necessity of projection.³⁹ Less clear and more problematic, however, is the double correspondence existing between physical and psychic occurrences; the physical event produces the psychical image which in its turn, through projection, originates the myth. Jung's theory may perhaps be correct; it seems, however, more plausible to ascribe the cause of myth not to the external event, but to the urge of basic inner needs inherent in human nature, needs that are expressed and solved in the history related in myths. Life, birth, death, resurrection, love, struggle, religion, evil, and survival are but a few basic human problems haunting man for millennia, basic even for primitives, who project them upon physical occurrences. The physical event does not seem to produce the myth, but the physical event provides the projection with the occasion for its appearance; thus, the coming of the sun provides the occasion for the birth of a hero who dwells nowhere but in the soul of man. As Eliade says, "Symbols cannot be reflections of cosmic rhythms as *natural phenomena*, for a symbol always reveals something *more* than the aspect of cosmic life it is thought

37. *Ibid.*, VIII, 154-155.

38. Lévy Bruhl, *Les Concepts de Lucien Lévy Bruhl*, p. 199: "Parente intime de reve et du myth." Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. 131: "As early as 1909 I realized that I could not treat latent psychosis if I did not understand their symbolism. It was then that I began to study mythology."

39. Mircea Eliade, *Myth and Reality* (New York, 1963), p. 185.

to represent."⁴⁰ The symbols arise, from the beginning, as a creation of the unconscious psyche, not as a reflection of a cosmic event.

Since archaic man relates and subordinates all causality to spirits, gods, and the supernatural, myths by their very nature are sacred histories explaining the work of gods upon the cosmos and man. Jung considers myth as the living religion of primitive man, in agreement with Lévy Bruhl and modern anthropologists. "Myths," Eliade says, "describe the various and sometimes dramatic breakthrough of the sacred (or the 'supernatural') into the world. . . . The myth is regarded as a sacred history and hence a 'true history,' because it always deals with realities."⁴¹

Origin of Archetypes—Jung's writings do not always distinguish clearly between myth and archetypes. Perhaps the distinction may lie in the concepts of act and potency, whole and part, and cause and effect. Archetypes are a kind of readiness to produce over and over again the same or similar mythical ideas. Thus, archetypes are only potencies that when actualized bring forth the same mythical idea. Archetypes and myths are also like whole and parts, because myth seems to be only a partial expression of the content of archetypes since archetypes manifest themselves in forms not always equivalent to myth, as in fairy tales, dreams, and the product of psychotic activity. Finally, myths and archetypes are like causes and effects, because the existence of archetypes depends on myth: "What we do find . . . is the myth of the sun-hero in all its countless modifications. It is this myth, and not the physical process, that forms the sun archetype."⁴² Thus archetypes are originated as a consequence of the subjective fantasies or ideas aroused by myths; archetypes are recurrent impressions made by subjective reactions. On the other hand, once the archetype is formed, it possesses a kind of

40. Mircea Eliade, *Images and Symbols*, p. 176.

41. Mircea Eliade, *Myth and Reality*, p. 6. Lévy Bruhl, *op. cit.*, p. 81: "Les mythes sont l'histoire sainte de sociétés primitives." B. Malinowski, *op. cit.*, p. 108: "Myth . . . is a narrative resurrection of primeval reality, told in satisfaction of deep religious wants, moral cravings, social submissions, assertions, even practical requirements. . . . Myth is thus a vital ingredient of human civilization."

42. *Coll. Works*, VII, 68.

readiness to produce over and over again the same or similar mythical ideas.⁴³

In spite of Jung's explanation, the relation of myth and archetypes is not yet clear. It is the myth which forms the archetype, and at the same time, it is the archetype which produces mythical ideas. Is it a vicious circle? Not likely, because for Jung, the subjective fantasies of myths are the causes of archetypes. But once the archetype is formed, it is endowed with a kind of readiness to arouse the same mythical ideas which were the cause of its formation, a familiar psychological process. Habits and dispositions are formed in the same way; repetition of acts forms the habit, but once the habit exists it is inclined to produce the very acts that were the cause of its existence: "Not only are archetypes, apparently, impressions of over-repeated typical experiences, but, at the same time, they behave empirically like agents that tend towards the repetition of the same experiences."⁴⁴

The origin of archetypes is also related to history, for they are explained by assuming them to be the deposit of constantly repeated experiences of humanity. Experiences of thousands of years of adaptation and existence have been engraved in our psychic constitution as forms without content. Not every experience, however, produces these forms, but the mental processes of our ancestors traced them.⁴⁵ Hence Jung regards the archetypes as the historical background of the psyche and, as such, they contained in a concentrated way the entire succession of engrams (imprints) which for time immemorial have determined the psychic structure as it now exists and is inherited with the brain structure. Thus the investigation of the unconscious yields recognizable traces of the archetype structure which coincides with the myth motif, because the creative substratum is everywhere the same human psyche and the same brain, which, with minor variations, functions everywhere in an identical way.⁴⁶

But no such engrams have been found in the brain, and Jung

43. *Ibid.*, VII, 68-69.

44. *Ibid.*, VII, 69.

45. *Ibid.*, VII, 68-69; VI, 272; VIII, 53-54; IX, i, 48.

46. *Ibid.*, VI, 211; VIII, 170; V, xxix, 390.

himself realizes that the repetition of experiences does not totally clear the enigma: "Naturally, this assumption," he says, "only pushes the problem further back without solving it."⁴⁷ Moreover, although Jung discovered reminders of Greek mythology in the dreams of pure American Negroes, he also reports the experience with European immigrants whose dreams were similar not to European mythologies, but to those of American Indians, which shows the importance of soil and weather in the psychology of peoples. But Jung never denies the significance of these elements. On the contrary, he regards them as vital elements in the making of our mental structure.

Just as, in the process of evolution, the mind has been molded by earthly conditions, so the same process repeats itself under our eyes today. It is not difficult to tell a Spanish Jew from a North American Jew, a German Jew from a Russian Jew. . . . Our contact with the unconscious chains us to earth, and makes it hard for us to move. . . . He who is rooted in the soil endures."⁴⁸ Jung, pressed by criticism, gradually modified his hypothesis on the origin of archetypes and says: "These images are 'primordial' images insofar as they are peculiar to whole species, and if they ever 'originated' their origin must have coincided at least with the beginning of the species."⁴⁹ This is probably true, and equivalent to saying that they were not originated by recurrent experiences. He also confesses that, "whether the archetypes ever 'originated' at all is a metaphysical question and therefore unanswerable."⁵⁰

The origin of archetypes is shrouded in mystery, but it is of great importance to emphasize and make clear that the validity of the existence of archetypes is totally independent of the knowledge of their origin. They are like migrant birds; we clearly see them, although we do not know where they come from.

Properties of Archetypes—Archetypes are not innate ideas by means of which we know, as in Plato's theory of knowledge. They are inborn dispositions to produce parallel images, ideas

47. *Ibid.*, VII, 69.

48. *Ibid.*, X, 45, 49.

49. *Ibid.*, IX, i, 78; Cf. XI, 89.

50. *Ibid.*, IX, i, 101.

in the Platonic sense that influence our thoughts, feelings, and actions. In his first work, Jung called the archetypes "dominants," that is, *types*. Some types of situations and types of figures repeat frequently, and Jung calls these "motifs." They emerge often in dreams, like for example the shadow, the wise old man, the mother, the anima, etc. These "motifs" are prominent archetypes and crucial factors in Jung's process of individuation.⁵¹

Archetypes are typical, universal, uniform, and regular modes of apprehension which manifest themselves everywhere in identical fashion, not as concrete forms but as forms without content, representing merely the possibilities of a certain type of perception and action. The typical form of apprehension of archetypes is not a pure intellectual apprehension of external objects, as is the activity of the speculative intellect productive of science. Nor is it the apprehension proper to the practical intellect, prerequisite for the appetite that being blind needs the presentation of objects by the cognitive power which directs the action and judges the value of its operation. Archetypes gaze inward, and their apprehension falls upon the inner primordial images that are directly connected with myth. The archetype represents the authentic element of what Jung calls the *spiritus rector* which apprehends the internal psychic world, not the nature of external objects or the value of them.⁵²

Although archetypes are factors composing the collective unconscious, they are nevertheless camouflaged in modern attire and interwoven with concrete elements of the individual psyche. Archetypes are forms without content, and their pre-existent traces are filled out by individual experiences. Hence although the archetypes always manifest themselves in identical fashion, their concrete expression, filtered through individual consciousness, may assume great diversity. Personal life actualizes the potentialities of archetypes because they possess an invariable nucleus of meaning, but always in principle, never as regards their concrete manifestation. For instance, the specific

51. *Ibid.*, V, 158, 301; IX, i, 75, 183; XI, 519.

52. *Ibid.*, VIII, 137-138, 206.

appearance of the mother image into consciousness at any given time cannot be deduced from the mother archetype alone but it depends on the conscious and concrete experiences with mothers, and also upon innumerable other factors.⁵³

Archetypes are not intellectual modes of apprehension of the external world. But as primordial images, they underlie all thinking and have considerable influence on scientific ideas, religion, philosophy, and ethics. For example, the idea of the principle of conservation of energy, discovered by Robert Mayer is archetypal, according to Jung. It is connected with the idea of power, an idea which has been stamped in the human brain for centuries. Only certain conditions are needed for its appearance, and these were evidently fulfilled in the case of Robert Mayer. The ideas of atoms and ether are also primitive intuitions, according to Jung. Wolfgang Pauli, Nobel laureate and one of the leading physicists of the century, ascribes to archetypal ideas the root of Kepler's scientific theories.⁵⁴ The archetypes seem also to have influence in all states of the mind requiring intuition, creative imagination, fantasy, artistic elaboration, and the inner experiences of the mystic.

However, in spite of the support of such an outstanding physicist as Pauli, very few scientists and philosophers will accept without reservations Jung's astonishing interpretation. The discovery of the principles of modern physics, and of science in general as well, presupposes a painstaking, slow, and reflective intellectual elaboration. These principles, the history of science teaches, never appear abruptly, as archetypes do, but only after a long period of meditation. When Newton was asked how he came to make the discovery of gravitation, he replied, "I keep the subject constantly before me, and I wait until the first glimmer of light begins to dawn slowly and gradually, and changes into full light and clarity."⁵⁵

53. *Ibid.*, V, 64; VIII, 3, 110; IX, i, 80.

54. *Ibid.*, XI, 289; VII, 68; VIII, 158, 137 fn.

55. Quoted by Pierre Duhem, *The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory* (Princeton, 1954), pp. 256-257. Naturally, the discovery of modern scientific theories presupposes a certain amount of intuition and creative imagination. But these two factors are conscious and reflective, not unconscious.

The archetypes cannot be known directly because they are unconscious. But they reveal themselves and are made visible in the products of fantasy where they find their specific and concrete application. Archetypes are inherited dispositions of the mind to produce parallel fantasy images which are only indirectly related to external objects. They depend much upon the unconscious fantasy activity and appear more or less abruptly as visions, dreams, and sudden intuitions. The image is like a concentrated symbolic expression of the total psychic situation; it never takes the place of reality, and as a rule it lacks all projection in space. Images are visual, primordial, and collective, proper to the mentality of primitives. They show similarities with familiar mythologic motives, and they are usually connected to the sacred.⁵⁶

Besides images there are also ideas which owe their origin to images because they constitute, as it were, their maternal soil. Ideas are abstract elaborations of the intellect, distinguished from images which are concrete manifestations of fantasy. They are imparted with creative force, vitality, and operation; they also condition feelings.⁵⁷

The contents of the archetypes emerge into consciousness in the form of tendencies or definite ways of looking at things. These subjective tendencies are stronger than the objective influence of the external world, on account of their psychic value which is higher. Hence they superimpose themselves upon all external impressions, for the inner world is more valuable than external realities. When the archetypes are revealed in dreams, fantasies, or in life, their influence either exercises a numinous or fascinating effect, or impels to action. These effects are so strong as to produce extensive alterations in the subject, such as religious conversions, suggestions, and even schizophrenia. In the case of religious phenomena, characterized by the numinous, the subject is gripped by the unconscious as though by an instinct. Where does this power of archetypes come from? Jung answers: from the feeling of being a part of the whole.⁵⁸

56. *Coll. Works*, IX, i, 78; V, 158; VI, 554-555.

57. *Ibid.*, VI, 547-550.

58. *Ibid.*, VI, 476; VII, 69; V, 158, 178.

The archetypes are not obscure corners of the mind, but the mighty deposit of ancestral experiences accumulated over millions of years. They are the echo of prehistoric happenings to which each century adds an infinitesimal amount of variation and differentiation. The archetypes bring to contemporary man the mind of our ancestors: their mode of thinking, feeling, and experiencing life. They are the unwritten history of mankind from time unrecorded, making the past to be present. Rational formulas, Jung continuously insists, may satisfy the present, the immediate past, but never the experience of man as a whole. We think in term of years, the unconscious thinks and lives in term of millennia.⁵⁹

That the archetypes bring forth to the present individual the mind of our ancestors is probably correct, as dreams, schizophrenia, and other observed phenomena reveal. More problematic is the share we are supposed to possess of the wisdom of archaic man, which we inherit with the archetypes. Where does the wisdom of archaic man lie? Why do archetypes think in terms of millennia? There exists, indeed, a natural wisdom in the process of evolution and adaptation of man to environmental circumstances. Primitives living in the jungle know the science of survival, of hunting, fishing, and of justice. Even more, they possess a mythical wisdom in order to explain and solve the basic human riddles, and they have a healthy psychological attitude toward certain family and tribal problems, as their initiations, for example, indicate. But they are often the victims of nature rather than its masters. They live in terror of magical influences which may cross the path of their lives at any moment; magic is the science of the jungle, and fear the state of mind of primitives. Probably the best wisdom we can learn from the primitives lies in the unselfish approach to the problems of the tribe, their religious attitude, and their stoic acceptance of suffering which, in their case, is an inexorable law they know to be part of their lives. In other words, we go back once more to the disputed origin of archetypes. The wisdom, might, and value of archetypes are not necessarily linked

59. *Ibid.*, VIII, 376; XI, 168.

to the archaic activity of primitives nor to their wisdom. They would rather depend on the intrinsic nature and properties of man, especially those properties connected to religion and other spiritual values.

The archetypes dispose of a whole world of images whose boundless range yields in nothing to the claims of the world of external realities. But insofar as archetypes go, they are as many as there are "typical situations in life," since they typify the most frequently and intensely used functions of the human soul. Therefore, the most ordinary events with immediate realities, like husband, wife, father, mother, child, hero, danger, birth, death, and resurrection, etc., emerge as an exalted group of archetypes endowed with tremendous power. The archetypes are, besides, the supreme regulating principles of religion and political life. Some of them are "dominant," like the anima, animus, wise old man, witch, shadow, earthmother, and so forth. Others are the "organizing dominants," usually with the function of combining and unifying several archetypes, as the self, the circle, and the quaternity.⁶⁰

II. *Instincts*

Instincts are psychological factors pertaining to the collective unconscious. Thomas Reid defines them saying: "By instinct, I mean a natural impulse to certain actions, without having any end in view, without deliberation and without any concep-

60. *Ibid.*, IX, i, 48; VIII, 156; VI, 211. Regarding the images of archetypes, Jung says: "Like the sea itself, the unconscious yields an endless and self-replenishing abundance of living creatures, a wealth beyond our fathoming. We may long have known the meaning, effects, and characteristics of unconscious contents without ever having fathomed their depths and potentialities, for they are capable of infinite variation and can never be depotentiated" (XVI, 177). Jolande Jacobi, *The Psychology of C. G. Jung* (New Haven, 1954), pp. 61-64: "The number of archetypes is relatively limited for it corresponds to the possibilities of typical fundamental experiences, such as humans have had since the beginning of time. Their significance lies, precisely, on that 'primal experience,' which they represent and mediate. . . . The sum of the archetypes signifies thus the sum of all latent potentialities of the human psyche."

tion of what we do."⁶¹ Jung finds this definition insufficient; for him the uniformity of the phenomenon and the regularity of its recurrence form the characteristic trait of instincts. Instincts are "typical modes of action, and wherever we meet uniform and regularly recurring modes of action and reaction we are dealing with instincts, no matter whether it is associated with a conscious motive or not."⁶² Instincts are collective, universal, and regularly occurring phenomena whose energy is unconscious. They manifest themselves as natural impulses toward certain activities, expressed as patterns of biological behavior. They are motivating forms of psychic events which pursue their inherent goals long before there is any consciousness. In other words, for Jung, instincts are psychic elements, free from the control of the conscious mind and endowed with a natural inclination towards the objects fitting for them. This idea reminds us of the following words of Aquinas: "The natural appetite is that inclination which each thing has, of its own nature, for something; wherefore by its natural appetite each power desires something suitable to itself. . . ." ⁶³

Instincts and archetypes are different psychological factors making up the collective unconscious. They are different because instincts are modes of existence and archetypes are modes of apprehension; instincts are natural impulses expressed as typical and regular modes of action and reaction while archetypes are dominants which emerge into consciousness as ideas and images.⁶⁴ And yet while instincts and archetypes are different, they are not independent; they are, on the contrary, intimately related, for the archetypes are the images of instincts themselves. Archetypes are the patterns of instinctual behavior; that is to say, the forms and categories that regulate the instincts. The image is the instinct's perception of itself; the self portrait of the instinct in exactly the same way as consciousness is the inward perception of the objective life process. The image of

61. *Coll. Works*, VIII, 130.

62. *Ibid.*, VIII, 135. See also: VIII, 200-201, 118, 115, 158; VI, 565; IX, i, 43-44.

63. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 78, a. 1 ad 3. Cf. I, q. 80, a. 1.

64. *Coll. Works*, VIII, 133-135, 217-218; VI, 476.

archetypes is the bridge uniting instincts and archetypes.⁶⁵

However, this connection is not always clear in Jung's own writings. For example, he quotes Freud in the following passage: "An instinct can never become an object of consciousness—only the idea that represents the instinct can. Even in the unconscious, moreover, an instinct cannot be represented otherwise than by an idea." Jung criticizes the second part of the sentence saying: "Exactly *who* has the idea of the instinct in the unconscious state? For unconscious ideation is a *contradiction in adjecto*."⁶⁶ Ideas are elaborations of the conscious mind exclusively; hence an unconscious idea is an impossibility. But Jung seems to fall into the same difficulty. He says: "Just as the conscious apprehension gives our actions form and direction, so unconscious apprehension through the archetype determines the form and direction of instinct."⁶⁷ The riddle is obvious, because an "unconscious apprehension" seems almost as impossible to understand as an unconscious ideation. The only possible ideation of the unconscious is realized by means of images—the conscious symbol of archetypes—and the corresponding ideas abstracted from them. This is perhaps Jung's own interpretation, for he says: "There are, in fact, no amorphous instincts, as every instinct bears in itself the pattern of its situation. Always it fulfills an image and the image has fixed qualities. Such an image is an *a priori* type. . . . The images of archetypes are these *a priori* instinct types which provide the occasion and the pattern for man's activities, insofar as he functions instinctively. . . . We may say that the image represents the *meaning* of the instinct."⁶⁸

By relating archetypes and instincts Jung is aware of a thorny problem: the connection between the dynamism of the unconscious and its corresponding apprehension of objects. The unconscious is not a static factor but, on the contrary, a vital power which manifests its activity through the operation of instincts. Hence, there will be as many instincts as there are

65. *Ibid.*, IX, i, 44; VIII, 137, 158.

66. *Ibid.*, VIII, 200 fn.

67. *Ibid.*, VIII, 137.

68. *Ibid.*, VIII, 201.

different kinds of operations. And yet, how is it possible to know the different kinds of operations if they are unconscious? The originality of Jung's ideas lies mainly in the consideration of archetypes as the patterns of instinctual behavior, as the images or self-portraits of instincts. Thus the archetypes specify and distinguish the different kinds of instincts because to every regular and uniform form of activity there corresponds a regular and uniform form of apprehension. The diversity of instincts reveals their nature to consciousness through the appearance of different kinds of symbolic images that are like the goal of the instinctual activity. "Instincts," Jung says, "have two main aspects: on the one hand, that of dynamism and compulsion, and on the other, specific meaning and intention."⁶⁹ And further: "Instincts are highly conservative and of extreme antiquity as regards both their dynamism and their form. Their form, when represented to the mind, appears as an image which expresses the nature of the instinctive impulse visually and concretely, like a picture. . . . Instinct is anything but a blind and indefinite impulse, since it proves to be attuned and adapted to a definite external situation. This latter circumstance gives it its specific and irreducible form. . . . its form is age-old, that is to say, *archetypal*."⁷⁰

Are instinctual human activities independent of knowledge? Is apprehension equivalent to knowledge? Instincts are by definition unconscious, but the cognitive power perceives their activities, as is obvious when a being endures pangs of hunger or deep loneliness.⁷¹ But this does not answer our question directly. It is manifest, however, that in most cases the instinctual reaction underlying motion seems to be always in correspondence with specific human needs already known by a previous cognitive apprehension. This is clear in the case of the five instincts which Jung mentions, namely, hunger, sex, drive to activity, reflection, and creativity, whose objects are presented to the instinct by the intellect or senses. Sensitive and intellectual

69. *Ibid.*, X, 287.

70. *Ibid.*, X, 282.

71. Although the appetite as such is unconscious, it can be known by analysis of its acts. For example, Aquinas explains how the will can be known by means of the intellect: *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 87, a. 4, ad 2.

knowledge is required for the instinctual activity which belongs to man, inasmuch as he is sensitive and rational. But knowledge does not seem required for other activities, because from every form follows a natural inclination. And as Aquinas says, "In those things that lack knowledge that form is found to be inclined always towards one thing fitting to it." Although in these cases he adds, "Even natural love, which is in all things, is caused by a kind of knowledge, not indeed existing in natural things themselves, but in Him who created their nature."⁷² The activity of any instinct totally deprived of knowledge seems unintelligible.

Do instincts need primordial images as their self portrait? Does instinctual human activity depend on the apprehension of archaic patterns? The continuous activity of instincts, seemingly independent of any archaic connotation, appears to deny such necessity. No primordial image is required for a hungry man or a person in love. Appropriated concrete existing objects are sufficient to orient their activities.

Nobody would deny such observations, but these obvious facts have no bearing on the existence of archetypes because, as we explained above, archetypes are interwoven with individual elements. Consequently, the regularity and uniformity of instinctual behavior are explained in terms of the regular apprehension of archetypes; their concrete actualization, however, is explained by the individual external beings which fill their potentialities. Primordial images will probably appear whenever there is a slackening of consciousness, as in dreams or other circumstances. For example, Eliade relates the following contemporary event: "When the Congo became independent in 1960, in some villages their inhabitants tore the roofs off their huts to give passage to the gold coins that their ancestors were to rain down. . . . Even the orgasmic excesses had a meaning, for, according to the myth, from the dawn of the New Age all women would belong to all men."⁷³ The myth of the

72. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 2 ad 3. The complexity of human inclinations can be seen in *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 94, a. 2.

73. Mircea Eliade, *Myth and Reality*, p. 3. In *Cosmos and History* he says: "Marriage and the collective orgy echo mythical prototypes; they are repeated because they were consecrated in the beginning by gods, ancestors, or heroes" (p. 4).

destruction of the world, followed by a new creation and the establishment of the golden age, underlies these primordial activities. Furthermore, there are unmistakable traits of myth in the behavior of contemporary man, as will be shown later. Hence, as evident in these examples, primordial images and concrete external objects are not mutually opposed, but rather complementary.

Archetypes and instincts, however, do not always behave in the way explained above. When the archetypes appear in the form of spirit, Jung says, the relation between archetype and instinct follows a different course. Then archetypes and instincts are the most opposite imaginable, as can be seen when one compares a man who is ruled by his instinctual drive with a man who is seized by the spirit. But they subsist side by side as reflection in our mind of the opposition that underlies all psychic energy. Psychic energy flows as a consequence of the opposition between instinct and spirit. However, the question of whether a process is to be described as spiritual or as instinctual remains shrouded in obscurity. A poorly developed archetype will see in the instinctual drives the source of all reality. Conversely, a consciousness that finds itself in opposition to the instinct can—in consequence of the enormous influence exerted by the archetype—subordinate instinct to spirit.⁷⁴

The connection existing between the archetype of the spirit and instincts reminds us of the interwoven world of the will and lower passions. Their corresponding objects appear on occasions as opposite, and since the control of the will over the passions is far from being absolute, struggle and hardship ensues as a natural sequel. For Jung, however, opposition and polarity are prerequisites of energy; the greater the opposition the greater the flow of energy. But this seems to contradict the facts of psychological observation. More energy is available in a man whose passions are subdued to the will than in a man unable to control them, although it is also evident that no human growth is possible without struggle, fight, and even failures.

74. *Coll. Works*, VIII, 206–207.

II

Jung's Process of Individuation

As a psychologist Jung is mainly concerned with a purely intellectual analysis of the structure and dynamics of human personality. But Jung is not only a psychologist, he is also a psychiatrist, a therapist interested in the welfare of his patients and in the growth of their personalities. Psychology, he says, culminates of necessity in a development process which is peculiar of the psyche; a development of man to the limits corresponding to his nature, occurring only when the person becomes a psychological individual, a separated indivisible unity, a whole. Becoming a whole is the answer to the great question of our day: How can consciousness, our most recent acquisition which is bounded ahead, be integrated with the oldest, the unconscious, which has lagged behind? Individuation, therefore, is a synthetic human phenomenon which follows the natural course of life; consciousness must confront the unconscious, and a balance between their opposition must be found. And since, according to Jung, the unconscious is the root of religious experience and the dwelling of the God-image, individuation is "the life in God," for man is obviously not a whole without God.¹

Difficulties—Individuation is an exceedingly difficult task; it always involves a conflict of duties and claims, the claims of consciousness against those of unconsciousness, the solution of which requires us to understand that our "counter will," the unconscious, is also an aspect of God's will. It is an heroic and

1. C. G. Jung in H. L. Philip, *Jung and the Problem of Evil* (New York, 1959), p. 225. *Coll. Works*, VIII, 223; IX,1, 275, 330; VII, 171. "Individuation . . . is a process of differentiation, having for its goal the development of the individual personality" (VI, 561).

words, "God himself in every part," it has to mirror necessarily the attributes of the Creator, namely, his duality and polarity. Hence Jung's ideas on God presuppose—although he bitterly resents the accusation—a renewal of the old Manichean idea of God as a duality. "I did not know that evil is but the privation of the good," Augustine says, explaining how he fell into the Manichean error. "How could I have seen this, for my vision was limited with my eyes, to material bodies; with my mind, to phantasm?"³⁶ Does Jung partake of the same principles that plunged Augustine into error? Perhaps not; one thing is however clear: his errors are not empirical but philosophical. The duality of God is not observable, nor are his ideas on evil and sin. Philosophically speaking our ignorance of the true nature of God paves the way to anthropomorphism and, consequently, to a version of Him depicted from our knowledge of material bodies and of our own; from duality in nature and man to duality in God, a common mortal jump. And what is easier and even worse: from duality in God to duality in nature and man. In spite of his insights and valuable observations, Jung here appears to us as a tentative philosopher, groping in the dark.

36. St. Augustine, *Confessions*, Bk. 3, ch. 7, 12; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 49, a. 3, explains the Manichean error in these words, "Because they failed to consider the universal cause of all being, and considered only the particular causes of particular effects . . . because they found two contrary particular causes of two contrary particular effects, they did not know how to reduce these contrary particular causes to the universal common cause; and therefore they extended the contrariety of causes even to the first principles. . . ." See also *Coll. Works*, IX, ii, 61 fn.

VI

Religion and Myth

Among the majority of theologians and philosophers myth enjoys a poor reputation. For them, myth means a kind of knowledge opposite to reality and synonymous with story, tale, or fiction. This is however an easy simplification; for although this may perhaps be true regarding the object upon which the mythological thinking falls (usually the image of the sacred), it is false regarding the psychological and religious significance revealed by mythical thinking. If we take myth as "a narrative resurrection of a primeval reality, told in satisfaction of deep religious wants, a vital ingredient of human civilization . . . a pragmatic charter of primitive faith and moral wisdom,"¹ then myth should be considered primarily not as a tale or fiction but as a psychological expression of man's deepest needs. Myth reveals and manifests the marks of primitive man and, in a sense, also of modern man, because paradoxically myth is yet an important factor determining our behavior and dreams.

Character of Myth

For primitives, everything lacking exemplary models is meaningless and without reality, for reality is acquired solely through repetition of models. Objects and actions become real insofar as they imitate or repeat archetypes; and since only the first manifestation of a thing is significant and valid, objects and actions acquire values and are real if they reproduce the mythical acts of primordial beings. For this reason the cosmogonic myth is ordinarily the exemplary model for every kind

1. B. Malinowski, *Magic, Science and Religion*, p. 101.

of creation and doing. As gods did, so must man too: this is the pattern of the behavior of primitive man. Hence, the enchanted world of gods, heroes, and ancestors is endowed with special meaning because they provide the paradigmatic personages for archaic society. Therefore, the myth, teaching the first story of everything that is meaningful to primitive life, supplies models for human behavior. "The return to the origins and to primordially is a basic feature of every mythology," Kerenyi says. "The philosopher tries to pierce through the world of appearance in order to say what 'really is,' but the teller of myths steps back into primordially in order to tell us what 'originally was.'"² Good and evil, life and death, gods and demons and rest of human puzzles find solution and explanation in these archetypal histories which shape the life of primitive man, whose life is meaningful and real only as he imitates extra-human models depicting the deeds of extraordinary exemplars.

The repetition of the mythical cosmogony is equivalent to a re-creation of the cosmos, and accordingly it projects the primitive man into mythical time. Primitive man transports himself to the time in which the creation took place to live there in a continuous present partaking thus the mysterious world of gods.³ And when primitives fly from time and space to be submerged in mythical time and space, they also fly from history, from the irreversibility that history entails, and from the meaningfulness of the historical present. For primitives history is not connected with the mysterious and elusive "now" which continuously passes away, but with primordial time and the primordial event that occurred in the beginnings. Primitive people abolish continuous history and give meaning to it only in connection with archetypal events, usually the happening of the gods and their deeds.⁴

2. Carl Kerenyi, *Essays on a Science of Mythology* (New York, 1949), p. 10. See a full explanation of these ideas in Mircea Eliade, *Cosmos and History and Myth and Reality*.

3. Mircea Eliade, *Images and Symbols*, p. 71.

4. This idea is fully developed and explained by Mircea Eliade in *Cosmos and History*.

Philosophical and Theological Implications of Myth

Myth reveals the theology and psychology of primitive man; therefore, theological and psychological elements are underlying the continuous appearance of myth over the centuries. Lévy Bruhl pointed out the identification of primitives with the tribe and with the cosmos, identification that he called "mytique." Accordingly, myth and ritual are cosmic in the sense that the history of myth and elements of ritual are always rich in cosmic objects and cosmic rhythms. And since the myth is holy, nature in this way becomes sacred. "By imitating the gods man remains in the sacred, hence in reality; by the continuous reactualization of paradigmatic divine gestures, the world is sanctified. Man's religious behavior contributes to maintaining the sanctity of the world."⁵

The spiritual attitude of primitives is not scientific. It is rather an attitude known as existential, a consequence of its peculiar situation in the universe. The myth is the answer to the riddle and mystery of his existence, a mystery which belongs to the awareness of sexuality, the consciousness of death, the puzzle of nature, the existence of good and evil, and above all the experience of the sacred. Hence, myth poses and solves the same problems as philosophy, but not by analysis and intellectual penetration of reality, proper to scientific speculation, but by drama, action, experience, and intuition. The myth gives meaning to life in the sequence of events making up the sacred history, answering thus how, by whom, and why things were made. Myth is like a primitive philosophy for it explains to the bewildered archaic man the perennial enigmas of life.

For Lévy Bruhl, myths are the holy histories of primitive society; the myth shows not dialectically, but by acting, the spiritual attitude of primitive man, actions that are genuine manifestation of man. As Aquinas says: "Just as human reason and will, in practical matters, may be made manifest by speech, so may they be known by deeds: since seemingly a man chooses

5. Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane*, p. 99.

as good that which he carries into execution."⁶ And this spiritual attitude is highly significant, for although myths, rituals, and symbols change, there always remains the common denominator underlying all them: "However their differences may be," the French anthropologist says, "the source remains the same; the mystical power of the supernatural."⁷

The myth reveals man's profound desire to go beyond the human condition, for religious experience leads towards transcendence. Man is not satisfied with what he attains here, with purely human models, and he longs for extraterrestrial paradises and suprahuman models: "The religious figure," Jung says, "cannot be mere man, for it has to represent what it actually is, namely, the totality of all the primordial images which express the 'extraordinary potent' always and everywhere. What we seek in visible human form is not a man, but a superman, the hero or God, the *quasi-human* being who symbolizes the ideas, forms and faces which grip and mould the soul."⁸

The myth does not delve into the secrets hidden in God's nature; the myth proceeds differently, for it describes the divinity as a wish fulfillment of man, revealing in this fashion the deep ontological religious craving of primitive man. The yearning for transcendence is the source from which springs the image of the mysterious gods. Hence, God has to be a hero, a superman, a being all powerful whose deeds and actions transcend the facts that make the human condition miserable, like duality, contingency, corruption, evil, fragmentary existence, and death. "Man desires to be always, effortlessly, at the very heart of the world of reality, of the sacred, and, briefly, to transcend, by natural means, the human condition and regain a divine state of affairs; what a Christian would call the state

6. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 97, a. 3. Jung, referring to the Indians, writes: "Their religious conceptions are not theories for them . . . but facts, as important and moving as the corresponding external realities" (*Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. 250).

7. Lévy Bruhl, *Les Concepts de Lucien Lévy Bruhl*, p. 189. Cf. Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. 340: "For it is not that God is a myth, but that myth is the revelation of a divine life in man."

8. *Coll. Works*, V, 177-178.

of man before the Fall."⁹ The primitive longs for ideal space, ideal time, ideal conditions, ideal unity, ideal forms, absolute values, and absolute realities. Through the magical power of ritual man escapes from terrestrial limitations in order to attain the realm of the ideal state, which is patrimony of the gods. And if transcendence is attained, so is unity, as its natural sequel, for there will always exist an unquenchable thirst to abolish fragmentary existences and disunity. In the divinity the opposites are symbolically unified, and by imitating the gods, "man no longer feels himself to be an 'air tight' fragment, but a living cosmos open to the other living cosmoses by which he is surrounded."¹⁰

Transformation and Corruption of Myths

History teaches that myths are sometimes corrupted, sometimes desacralized, and sometimes they simply disappear. Naturally, if we remember the distinction between the image of the sacred, and the psychological function of myth, then it is easy to understand the continuous transformation and metamorphosis of sacred images, rites, and symbols throughout the ages on the one hand, and the continuity of mythical thinking over the centuries on the other.

Since the image of the sacred in myth is colored by the strong affectivity of the sacred and by the primitive's need to identify himself with the cosmos and cosmos rhythms, these images are imbued with anthropomorphic marks and cosmic traits, both in need of purification. The metamorphosis of the gods is therefore a necessity and a logical consequence of the nature of myth itself. Little by little the gods are pictured less passionate, less carnal, and less cosmic, and their images more spiritual. Sometimes, strong personalities are the cause of profound religious revolutions, as history teaches for example with the prophets of Judaism, and in modern age with the secular Aryan myth of national socialism in Hitler's time. The majority of the

9. Mircea Eliade, *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, p. 383. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 184.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 455. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 385; *Myth and Reality*, pp. 139-140.

people always follow the impact made by strong and magnetic personalities, either for good or bad, as in the example of Hitler or Lenin.¹¹

Philosophical thought also purifies the image of the gods and the sacred, as happened for example in Greece at the time of Plato and Aristotle. A good philosophical speculation gradually strips the gods of crude anthropomorphic ideas, alien to the nature of the divinity. And since philosophy is founded on first principles, the ritualistic going back in search of paradigms, characteristic of myth, is replaced by an intellectual going back in search of intelligibility and evidence rooted in principles, characteristic of philosophy.

Finally, myth is sometimes corrupted by science, because science (like philosophy) gradually strips the gods of the cosmological elements ascribed to them by primitive man that science continuously purifies down to our time.

Mythological Thinking

However, although the metamorphosis of the gods goes on and should go on continuously for good, the mythical way of thinking as such does not disappear, for it is the expression of a profound psychological need. Men like Plato and Aristotle accepted the existence and importance of myth, although their speculations stripped the gods of erroneous traits, like passions and immorality. As Eric Voegelin writes: "Plato knows that one myth can and must supersede the other, but he also knows that no other human function, for instance 'reason' or 'science,' can supersede the myth itself. The myth remains the legitimate expression of the fundamental movement of the soul."¹²

11. Mircea Eliade, *Cosmos and History*, p. 108 fn: "Without religious elites, and more especially without the prophets, Judaism would not have become very different from the religion of the Jewish colony of Elephantine, which preserved the popular Palestinian religious viewpoint down to the fifth century B.C."

12. Eric Voegelin, *Order and History* (Louisiana, 1957), Vol. III, p. 186. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 191. "He rejects the old myth because it has become historically untrue; but he defends it, nevertheless, against the enlightened materialists who, from the historical untrue, will draw the conclusion that myth has no truth."

Therefore, if myth responds to a deep psychological need, its suppression is tantamount to the suppression of a vital human function which cannot be done without impunity. Plato warns of the serious consequence that the stability both of personality and society will endure from the postulate of a freedom from myth, because "the myth has a fundamental function in human existence and myths will be created no matter what anybody thinks about them. We cannot overcome the myth, we can only misunderstand it . . . the real danger to the soul does not come from the ancients; it comes from the enlightened moderns who not only misuse the old myth but also in their illusionary inflation through science have lost the truth of myth altogether."¹³ Thus the acceptance of myth seems to be the condition for a realistic understanding of the soul.

In other words, it is the spiritual psychological fact which is of paramount significance; and accordingly: "It matters little if the formula and images through which the primitive expresses 'reality' seem childish and even absurd to us. It is the profound meaning of primitive behavior that is revelatory; this behavior is governed by belief in an absolute reality opposed to the profane world of 'unrealities' . . . this behavior corresponds to a desperate effort not to lose contact with being."¹⁴ Myth reveals the religious instinct of archaic societies.

When myth is desacralized and stripped of its religious connotation, life and cosmos lose part of their mystery to be replaced by purely intellectual explanations—more accurate and objective indeed, but less attractive and poetic—which usually leave cold the human heart. For it is mystery, and not the purely rational explanation that pleases man and fills his appetite. In science these explanations are to be expected, but man does not live out of science alone. Poetry, music, art, morality, religion and the unconscious world of drives shape the pattern of our personality as well. The loss of sacrality disposes man for a pessimistic vision of the cosmos and himself.

We find it difficult to understand the psychological attitude underlying mythical thinking. Why? Because myth cannot be

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 187–190.

14. Mircea Eliade, *Cosmos and History*, p. 92.

accounted for exclusively by pure rational elements, but primarily by recourse to the unconscious. For Nietzsche, myth is a style of thinking according to the manner of the unconscious, and according to Zimmer the power of myth is derived from its position in the historical depths of the psyche: "There is no explicit commentary on the meaning of the mythological action. The tale goes straight to the listener through an appeal to his intuition, to his creative imagination. It stirs and feeds the unconscious. By an eloquence rather of incident than word, the mythology serves its function as a popular vehicle of the esoteric wisdom of yoga experience and of orthodox religion."¹⁵ For Plato, the world of myth can only be understood assuming the existence of the unconscious and its relation to consciousness. Accustomed as we are to sheer rational explanations and demonstrative thinking appealing exclusively to the intellect, the strange, intuitive, and affective charged world of myth appears foreign to the psychology of contemporary man, reluctant as he is to accept any explanation not in line with our ordinary process of scientific speculation. But there lies the crux of the matter: for primitives, the approach to reality is neither exclusively nor primarily rational, but emotional, intuitive, even irrational. It is the reaction of the "whole man" who, by appeal to cognitive and appetitive powers, to rational and irrational elements, to conscious and unconscious factors, solves thus the enigma of his existence, of nature, and of the gods.

Myth and Contemporary Man

Although gradually disappearing in the secular city, myth is, nevertheless, much more alive than it may appear at first glance. Myth indeed exists, perhaps not in its archaic and original sacred form, but in a more profane fashion, desacralized. "In every word of consciousness," Jung says, "such things hardly exist; that is to say, until 1933 only lunatics have been found in possession of living fragments of mythology. After this date, the world of heroes, of monsters, spread like a devastating force

over whole nations, proving that the strange world of myth had suffered no loss of vitality during the centuries of reason and enlightenment."¹⁶ Not only is the racist utopian of Aryanism mythical, as is Hitler's Germany; communism is also mythical which presupposes eschatological and millennialistic structure, as well as the archetypal slogan of liberation, freedom, peace elimination of social conflict, abolition of classes, perfect justice, and final and utopical terrestrial bliss.¹⁷

The comic strips, like the batman, the phantom, the superman, etc., pivot around the exemplary struggle of good and evil, hero and criminal, light and darkness. The same occurs with stories, novels, and movies depicting fantastic adventures, ideal planets, missions impossible, world organizations, strange beings and animals, superior men, etc., and the final victory of the good cause. They satisfy the secret longing of contemporary man for heroic and suprahuman achievements.

Mythical is the obsession for success, wealth, efficiency, fulfillment, and wishful thinking characteristic of contemporary man. "The old perfectly realizable Puritan imperative for the moment, 'work, save, deny the flesh,'" Margaret Mead says, "has shifted to a set of unrealizable imperatives, 'be happy, be fulfilled, be the ideal.'"¹⁸ To this is to be added the desire for novelties, for the exotic, for occultism, for astrology, for narcotics and drugs and for anything esoteric and mysterious, all of which will transport man to the realm of the unknown and mystical, of paradisaical experiences far beyond the dull experience of everyday.

16. *Coll. Works*, IX, ii, 35.

17. For a complete account of modern myths see, Mircea Eliade, *Myth and Reality*, pp. 181-193.

18. Margaret Mead, *Male and Female*, p. 193. Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. 236. "But it is precisely the loss of connection with the past, our uprootedness, which has given rise to the 'discontents' of civilization and to such a flurry and haste that we live more in the future and its chimerical promises of a golden age than in the present, with which our whole evolutionary background has not yet caught up. We rush impetuously into novelty, driven by a mounting sense of insufficiency, dissatisfaction, and restlessness. We no longer live on what we have, but on promises, no longer in the light of the present day, but in the darkness of the future, which we expect will at last bring the proper sunrise."

15. Heinrich Zimmer, *Myths and Symbols in Indian Art and Civilization* (New York, 1946), p. 40; Nietzsche, *Human All Too-Human*, p. 25.

Mythical is the sanctification of the cult of absolute freedom, of boundless liberty, of perfect peace, of mystical brotherhood among nations and mankind; of nudism and absolute sexual freedom in which everybody belongs to everybody else, like in a new Paradise where everything is communal, where guilt is absent, and conflict between individuals and society, between flesh and conscience does not arise. Mythical too is the boundless faith in psychoanalysis as the new magical ritual which frees man of the hindrances of the past and paves the way to the future. Mythical is the sacralization of science as the new god and scientists as the modern priesthood, which lead man and society towards a utopic future of infinite possibilities, for science possesses the key unlocking all mysteries and solving all difficulties. Mythical is Walt Disney's magical and fairy world which has enchanted millions of children and grown-ups; paradigmatical is his magic world of dwarfs, animals playing human roles, witches, angels, fairies of good and evil, of enchanted forests, and the aforesaid triumph of the good cause and punishment of evil.

The imitation of archetypes—of paradigms—which is also a characteristic mark of mythical thinking is also a common modern phenomenon. Naturally, modern man does not imitate the deeds of divine gods; he imitates the deeds, appearances, and even little details of human gods, of extraordinary exemplars that, because they symbolize the fulfillment of their dreams, give meaning to their lives, and the impression of achieving, even in a modest way, what the exemplar is famous for. Identification, projection, and imitation, are, as Freud put it so well, the characteristic feature of man's wish fulfillment. And so, archetypal are the images of millionaires, adventurers, kings, aristocrats, men in power, all America's beauty queens, heroes, play boys, beatles, fashions and looks. All these figures and images are paradigmatical for they give man a feeling of identification with the model, thus achieving reality. What the gods did we do—this is the pattern of behavior of primitive man achieving thus reality. What the modern gods did we do—this is the slogan of contemporary man who achieves a certain reality in this way. The power of our wishes will always trans-

port us beyond the realm of our limited existence, to the magic and enchanted world of dreams. Wishful thinking and imitation are human traits, but in forms that often assume mythical proportion and archetypal images.

Perhaps the best known manifestation of modern myth are the hippies: their desire to return to the primitive and simple, to the origin of things; their reactions against the norms set up by an artificial society; their revolt against authority and parents, against moral barriers and restrictions; their long hair, showy dresses, bare feet, the beat of drum and folk music; their sexual liberty and primordial brotherhood; their amulets which recall the power of magic; their use of drugs which projects them to an unknown world of fantastic dreams and mystical dimensions, etc. All these manifestations bear the mark of the paradise archetype on earth; of a mythical loneliness for a state of perfect happiness in freedom and love; of a going beyond the human condition, which in them is perhaps more acute because of the force of their desires, the emptiness of their family life, and the frustration of life itself.

All these are mythical manifestations, desacralized or simply hidden under profane dress, and even deprived of cosmic natural elements, which in an era of science are replaced by gadgets and all kinds of artificial tools. They presuppose a deep and inmost desire to escape from reality and to be submerged in a time and space that is fantastic, away from the time that crushes and kills. Never before in history has the desire to escape from reality been so manifest and common; it is the mark of contemporary humanity, showing that although we despise mythologies and theologies, this does not prevent us from recourse to paradigmatical images and symbols. As Eliade says, "Man whatever else he may be free of, is forever the prisoner of these archetypal intuitions; the extripation of myth is illusory."¹⁹ Man's view of the theme changes but the mythical theme does not, as happens, for example, to the exemplary

19. Mircea Eliade, *Images and Symbols*, p. 19. Cf. *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, p. 433. Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. 282. "Some ten years before, I had discovered that in many places in England the myth of the Grail was still a living thing. . . . Myths which day has forgotten con-

fight of good and evil which has undergone countless alterations over the centuries, although the theme and final victory of good cause always remain the same.²⁰

Not everybody shares this viewpoint: "If theology is to survive and to make any sense to the contemporary world," Harvey Cox says, "it must neither cling to a metaphysical world view, nor to collapse into the mythical mode. It must push on into a living lexicon of the urban-secular man."²¹ But a theology without metaphysics would rapidly lead to a variety of urban myths, beginning with the myth of a paradisaical city only existing in the minds of thinkers who transpose the paradise of Marx's utopian classless society to the new paradise of the secular city where the gods have fled. The problem is not so simple; Lewis Mumford, who knows too well the goods and evils of the modern city, writes: "If we continue in science and technology along the lines we are now following, without changing our direction. . . towards more valid human goals, the end is already in sight. Cybernetics, medical psychology, artificial insemination, surgery and chemotherapy have given the rulers of men the power to create obedient automatons, under remote control, with just enough mind to replace the machine when its cost would be prohibitive. The polite name of this creature is 'man in space' but the correct phrase is 'man out of his mind!'"²²

Hence, myth will survive in more or less sacred form because contemporary man did not lose yet the power of imitation of archetypal paradigms; nor the desire of transcendence and

to be told by might, and powerful figures which consciousness has reduced to banality and ridiculous trivialities are recognized again by poets and prophetically revived; therefore they can also be recognized 'in changed form' by the thoughtful person. The great ones of the past have not died, as we think: they have merely changed their names."

20. Mircea Eliade, *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, p. 433. "The function of the paradisaical land in perfect freedom remain unchanged: it is just that man's view of it has undergone a great displacement—from Paradise in the Biblical sense, to the exotic paradise of our contemporary dreams . . . at all levels of human experience, however ordinary, archetypes continue to give meaning of life and create cultural values. . . ."

21. Harvey Cox, *The Secular City* (New York, 1966), p. 251.

22. Lewis Mumford, *The City in History* (New York, 1961), p. 176.

suprahuman models; nor the longing for unity, for paradise, for salvation; nor the riddles of life, sexuality, evil, suffering, religion, and death; nor his desire for integration with the cosmos; nor the horror of history, nor the craving of being beyond time and space; nor the desire for eternity and eternal happiness; nor his attraction for heroes, monsters, fairies, angels, demons and gods. In other words, as long as man remains human, wishing and dreaming in a human way, myth will certainly appear, probably more rational and reflective and less intuitive and unconscious. Myth seems to spring still now from the inner recesses of man, at least partly from the unconscious, as explained by Jung, who ascribes to mythical thinking the archaic manifestation of the objective psyche, hidden though it may be to our conscious ego. But it is real and alive, and since it is alive, no human prophet is capable of foreseeing its reaction were we to try to abolish it. Reason is not enough; an exclusively rational world would appeal merely to a few individuals of unusual personality. The irrational is also part of our wholeness, as history continuously teaches over the centuries.

These reflections should be taken into consideration to understand what Jung wants to say in these words: "Theologians would do better to take account of these psychological facts than to go on 'demythologizing' them with rationalistic explanations that are a hundred years behind the times."²³ Although this idea cannot be accepted without reservations and severe qualifications, it expresses the demands of the irrational nature of man, often ignored by philosophers, theologians, and even psychologists.

The Christian Myth

With Judaism myth assumes new dimensions; the believer is indeed aware of the past, but in the first place he is looking to

23. *Coll. Works*, IX, i, 105. Cf. *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. 300-301.

"Unfortunately, the mythic side of man is given short shrift nowadays. . . . As a result, a great deal escapes him. . . . Mythic man, to be sure, demands a 'going beyond all that,' but scientific man cannot permit this. To the intellect, all my mythologizing is futile speculation. To the emotions, however, it is healing and valid activity; it gives existence a glamour which would not like to do without. Nor is there any reason why we should."

the future. Time ceases to be the mythical time of our ancestors, and reality is not realized by the imitation of the primordial deeds of the gods. For the first time history is endowed with a value itself, because every irreversible event appears as a manifestation of God's Providence, who reveals his will through the continuous flow of happenings.

With Christianity, God himself incarnates in history, and time is reckoned as before and after the birth of Christ, who gives history a meaning in connection with the unique historical event of his incarnation. Hence, Christianity and Judaism abolish the eternal return of things, the regeneration of time, and the going back of primitives in search of primordial paradigms. But Christianity is, as it were, mythical, because Christ is now the archetypal God whose deeds we have to imitate. He is the answer to everything in life, for he is the life, the truth, the way; he gives meaning to the cosmos, sanctified as it is by his terrestrial presence; even the eternal cycle of death and resurrection is fulfilled in him, because by his death and resurrection he conquered death itself to give us life. Furthermore, he is the embodiment of the self and the living myth of our culture because his person possesses the qualities of man and God. The Christian liturgy, on the other hand, pivots around the drama of his death and brings to us as present the sacrifice of the cross enacted as it is daily in the Mass. Moreover, Christ himself is ever living among us by his mysterious presence in the Blessed Sacrament. The Christian liturgical year is a continuous remembrance of the life of the Master, who is presented to the believer as the unique exemplar to imitate: annunciation, nativity, hidden life, preaching, miracles, passion, death, resurrection and ascension—that is to say, the whole life of Christ on earth is reenacted and remembered yearly through the power of ritual. This enables the Christian to share the fruits of the Redemption by his continuous incorporation into the mysteries of the life of Christ.²⁴

²⁴. See Mircea Eliade, *Images and Symbols*, pp. 169–172; *Cosmos and History*, p. 140; *Myth and Reality*, p. 65. "The end of the World will occur only once, just as the cosmogony occurred only once. The Cosmos that will reappear after the catastrophe will be the same Cosmos that God created

Therefore, with Christianity the ritual of myth is invested with double dimension: it is eschatological inasmuch as the present is projected into the future, into eternity, into the heavenly kingdom that faith promises to the believer. And it is also paradigmatical and looks at the past inasmuch as the ritual reenacts the time sanctified by the presence of Christ upon the earth. Hence, in a certain sense, Christianity and Christ embody the fulfillment of every myth—because it is eschatological and paradigmatical; because it is an imitation of God who Christ is; because it presupposes the restoration of the paradise in heaven; and because it incorporates into myth the supreme reality of an unique event which entails the fulfillment of every wish and the restoration of the heavenly Jerusalem. Not only does Christianity represent the fulfillment of Judaism, it also represents the fulfillment of every myth.

Philosophical Considerations on Myth

"Nature," Aquinas says, "has implanted in man an appetite for his last end in general so that he naturally desires to be completed in goodness. But, in just what that completeness consists . . . has not been determined for him by nature."²⁵ In other words, man is endowed with an unquenchable thirst for being, for happiness, for completion, for totality, for unity. But since happiness may assume a great variety of forms, it is far from easy to know the object that really fulfills man's need; the determination of that object is the consequence of an intellec-

at the beginning of Time, but purified, regenerated, restored to its original glory. This Earthly Paradise will not be destroyed again, will have no end. Time is no longer the circular Time of Eternal Return; it has become a linear and irreversible Time. Nor is this all: the eschatology also represents the triumph of a Sacred History. For the End of the World will reveal the religious value of human acts, and men will be judged by their acts."

²⁵. Thomas Aquinas, *De Verit.*, 22, 7. Cf. Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane*, p. 64. "Religious man can live only in a sacred world, because it is in such a world that he participates in being that has real existence. Thus religious need expresses an unquenchable ontological thirst. Religious man thirsts for being. His terror of the chaos that surrounds his inhabited world corresponds to his terror of nothingness."

tual inquiry followed by a free choice. Hence, a deep ontological desire for happiness is underlying every myth of primitives who have already made their choice: the sacred. For them, ontology is identified with sacrality, with the sacred revealed to them by the history of myth. This idea is like a re-echo of Plato's concept of participation for, according to Platonic thought, all created beings are beings by participation because they receive their entities from the First being who is God. In Aquinas' terms: "Every being has the act of existing in the proportion in which it approaches God by likeness. But according as it is found to be unlike Him, it approximates non-existence. And the same must be said of all the attributes which are found both in God and in creatures."²⁶

Therefore, although the natural appetite for happiness is being, in the last analysis the only object capable of filling man's capacity for being is the First being, Who is the end of everything existing and in a special way of man. The imitation of God is the end of everything created because God created the universe as an artist. And in the same way as the work of art has to imitate as perfectly as possible the idea existing in the mind of the artist, so every being has to reproduce the idea existing in the divine intellect. Hence, we must say that in the divine intellect are the types of all things which are called ideas, or exemplary forms existing in the divine mind. "Now, different things," Aquinas says, "imitate the divine essence in different ways, each one according to its own proper manner, since each has its own act of existence, distinct from that of another."²⁷

In this manner, therefore, God is the First exemplar of all things. In man, however, the imitation of God is most perfect and assumes an especial modality which is precisely the image of God in man. As explained before, the image of God consists primarily in the actual exercise of knowledge and love having God as the object; hence, inasmuch as man knows and loves

God he imitates God.²⁸ Accordingly, the mythical imitation of the gods by primitives has ontological and theological foundation, however archaic and imperfect the form of this knowledge and love may be. The knowledge of primitives is affected by strong emotions; emotions that have their roots in the vivid awareness of the supernatural. Naturally, archaic man is totally foreign to the idea of God as pure spirit, or any other abstract formulation of the divinity. He conceives God as a being who reveals himself with power and majesty, sometimes as a dreadful being, the God of terror, which profoundly affects the psychology of primitives. It is Rudolf Otto's *mysterium tremendum* which grips them with a feeling of hopelessness and awe. But although this Knowledge of God is imperfect and archaic, it nevertheless shapes their whole lives, no matter how subordinated and dependent these lives are upon the emotional awareness of the supernatural.²⁹

In man, the imitation of the gods is also a consequence of love, because through love man can attain God even more intimately than by knowledge. "The perfection of knowledge," Aquinas says, "requires that man should know distinctly all that is in a thing; such as its parts, powers, and properties. On the other hand, love is in the appetitive power, which regards a thing as it is in itself: wherefore it suffices, for the perfection of love, that a thing be loved according as it is known; since it can be loved perfectly, even without being perfectly known in itself. Hence it is, therefore, that a thing is loved more than it is known; since it can be loved perfectly, even without being

28. Thomas Aquinas, *De Verit.*, 28, 3: "The human soul in some sense touches God by knowing Him and loving Him." *Contra Gentiles*, III, ch. 25, 2: "A thing is more closely united with God by the very fact that it attains to His very substance in some manner, and this is accomplished when one knows something of the divine substance." *De Verit.*, 10, 7: "In that cognition by which the mind knows God the mind itself becomes conformed to God, just as every knower as such is assimilated to that which is known."

29. Lévy Bruhl, *op. cit.*, p. 68: "The cognitive point of view is totally accidental, subordinated and hidden by the emotions which are inseparable from the presence and action of supernatural forces. What occupies the conscience of primitives at the moment is the emotional category of the supernatural."

26. Thomas Aquinas, *De Verit.*, 23, 7.

27. *Ibid.*, 3, 2. Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 44, aa. 3-4; *De Verit.*, 22, 7.

perfectly known. . . . The same applies to the love of God."³⁰ Accordingly, although the knowledge of primitive man is vague and erroneous, it is nevertheless sufficient for the purpose of fostering love, which produces a certain imitation of the gods; for what is loved is in the lover by way of inclination.³¹ Moreover, since God is the First exemplar of everything created, when primitives imitate the primordial actions of the gods they are attempting to identify themselves with them, because every imitation is for the sake of attaining similarity with the exemplar which is imitated. This imitation, however naive and imperfect the form it may assume in itself, is revelatory of the religious instinct of archaic societies, whose activity springs from the belief that everything existing and real depends in the first place upon the presence and activity of all powerful gods. As explained above this idea has profound theological and metaphysical roots.

There are indications, Jung says, that at least a part of the psyche is not subject to the laws of space and time; there are experiments proving that the psyche at times functions outside of spatiotemporal law of causality. This is true indeed, for the human soul, by reason of its perfection, is not a form entirely embraced by matter: "The soul is capable of an operation which is accomplished without any bodily organ at all, for understanding is not affected through any bodily organ. That is why the intellectual soul by which man understands and which transcends the condition of corporeal matter, must not be wholly encompassed by or imbedded in matter, as material forms are. This is proved by its intellectual operation, wherein corporeal matter has no part."³²

30. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 2 ad 2.

31. Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentes*, IV, ch. 19, 4: "What is loved is not only in the intellect of the lover, but in his will as well. It is in the intellect by reason of the likeness of its species; it is in the will of the lover, however, as the term of a movement is in its proportioned motive principle by reason of the suitability and proportion which the term has for that principle. . . ."

32. *Ibid.*, II, ch. 68. Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 76, a. 1 ad 4: "The human soul, by reason of its perfection, is not a form merged in matter, or entirely embraced by matter. Therefore there is nothing to prevent some power

From the independence of the higher powers of the soul from matter follows an important property concerning myth: man in the sphere of the "spirit" possesses a kind of immobility, for immobility is the hallmark of spiritual substances; as against material ones, the trait of which is mobility. And since time depends on motion, a being independent of motion is also independent of time, which is the case of spiritual substances. Man, therefore, as composed of spirit and matter is "on the border line between eternity and time,"³³ as Aquinas put it. Hence, a vision exclusively irreversible of history, as unfolding continuously in time, cannot fully satisfy the higher powers of our being. Man as "spirit" craves for something absolute, immutable, and permanent in the turmoil of the particular, contingent, and corruptible, which is the world as revealed to us by the senses. The continuous resistance to irreversible history is a consequence of the immobility of man's mind. Even history considered as the Epiphany of God, essential mark of the Judeo-Christian tradition, points to something absolute and immutable. Why? Because, although God reveals Himself in time through concrete historical events, in the last analysis He does this for the sake of eternity; in eternity everything and everybody will be restored to eschatological dimension. Even irreversible history is salvation history; and salvation, Eliade notes, is equivalent to deliverance from cosmic time. Augustine poetically writes at the end of his *City of God*: "This 'seventh day' will be our Sabbath and it will end in no evening, but only in the Lord's day—that eighth and eternal day which dawned when Christ's resurrection heralded an eternal rest

thereof not being the act of the body, although the soul is essentially the form of the body." Jung expresses a similar idea: "There are indications that at least a part of the psyche is not subject to the laws of space and time. Scientific proof of that has been provided by the well-known J. B. Rhine experiments. Along with numerous cases of spontaneous foreknowledge, nonspatial perceptions, and so on. . . . These experiments prove that the psyche at times functions outside of the spatio-temporal law of causality" (*Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. 304). See J. B. Rhine, *Extrasensory Perception* (Boston, 1934), *The Reach of the Mind* (New York, 1947).

33. Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentes*, III, ch. 61.

both for the spirit and for the body. On that day we shall rest and see, see and love, love and praise—for this is to be the end without end of all our living; that Kingdom without end, the real goal of our present life."³⁴

This explains the resistance of primitives to history, their continuous flight to mythical time, and their tendency to seek refuge in the gods. Primitives are utterly ignorant but profoundly religious—a religiosity that because it is spontaneous possesses the fresh and simple value of revealing the significance of their religious instinct, however childish and absurd their images and ideas on the sacred may appear to people now.

Modern Man, Religion, and the Unconscious

The sacred realities of myth and its religious implication are lacking in the conscious life of the majority of contemporary Western man. His religious instinct, however, has not yet disappeared; it is now sometimes repressed, sometimes underdeveloped, for the majority is simply in the unconscious. Jung has proved that the contents and structure of the collective unconscious exhibit astonishing similarities with primitive images and symbols. And Eliade says that the only real contact with cosmic sacrality is realized by the unconscious; religion and mythology are now veiled in darkness.

The instinct is there, yes, but in desperate need of nourishment lest it dies of pure anemia. Although the desire of happiness is natural to everybody, the choice of the sacred is not; it is the result of a free election on the part of man's will. Religion demands a choice followed by strong determination and the continuous exercise of religious activity. It can die of stagnation, of pure indifference, or by positive repression. But even in those who have repressed God or have never thought in religious terms, the problem is far from being solved. Since anyone possesses an unconscious desire for God, when the sacred is ignored or repressed, dreams, tales, stories, fables, terrestrial paradises, supermen and all sorts of human gods replace the

34. St. Augustine, *The City of God*, Bk. XXII, ch. 30. Cf. Mircea Eliade, *Images and Symbols*, p. 73.

sacred. The sacred in all these instances will never attain its due stature; but neither does nonreligious man remain purely secular, for his human manifestations assume then a "hybrid" status that displays its nature in the variety of secular modern myths described before.

Are myth and religion identical? This question cannot be brushed aside because the relation of myth and other religious manifestations is crucial to clarify the meaning of religion as such. The same religious instinct seems to rest at the root of both. But their respective manifestations, although perhaps interwoven and even connected, are reducible to each other only with difficulty. Myth is more primitive, less reflective, more emotional and intuitive. It is the natural sequel of a psychology and human attitude which is the hallmark of primitive mentality. On the other hand, religion as we understand it now is more rational, more reflective, more analytic, less intuitive, less symbolic, less sentimental, and much less affected by Lévy Bruhl's mystique of the supernatural. This is why modern religion is less anthropomorphic, more dogmatic, less cosmic, and more accurate and scientific. Myth always distorts the sacred images, for emotions and irrational elements bear an important part in its formation. Dogma is much more perfect than myth; it will always describe the nature of God better.

But in practice it will always be hazardous to draw a radical separation between the manifestation of both; mythical elements appear sometimes interwoven even with Christian religious images and symbols. The purification of Christianity from pagan elements has not yet been totally successful. "In the folklore and religious practices of the rural population at the end of the nineteenth century there still survived figures, myths, and rituals from earliest antiquity, or even from proto-history," Eliade says. And then he adds: "For the peasants of Eastern Europe this in no sense implied a 'paganization' of Christianity, but, on the contrary, a 'Christianization' of the religion of their ancestor."³⁵ Furthermore, if the conclusions of Jung are valid, traits of the mythical way of thinking will

35. Mircea Eliade, *Myth and Reality*, pp. 171-172.

appear in contemporary man in fashion more or less unforeseeable and unpredictable, though not always in their original sacred form. The shadow, the anima, the old wise man, and the self will always reveal themselves into consciousness in a manner not necessarily in conformity with a purely rational way of thinking. There are factors in the unconscious not easily detected by reason, and even less easily controlled by the ego. The magic and spontaneity of religious symbolism have not yet been lost.

VII

Jung's Ideas on Neurosis

Neurosis is primarily a suffering of the soul; and since the soul affects man in his totality, neurosis affects the whole of man. So neurosis cannot be an isolated, defined phenomenon; it is the reaction of the whole human being. There is not such a thing as a neurosis but rather a man who has a neurosis. "One cannot treat the psyche," Jung says, "without touching on man and life as a whole, including the ultimate and deepest issues, any more than one can treat the sick body without regard to the totality of its functions—or rather, as a few representatives of modern medicine maintain, the totality of the sick man himself. The more 'psychological' a condition is, the greater its complexity and the more it relates to the whole of life."¹ Accordingly, regarding mental health the problem of the unity within the multiplicity of human factors is crucial because all these factors influence the totality and unity of man. And since neurosis affects the whole man, "the significance of human neurosis cannot, admittedly, be purely metaphysical, since man is not spirit; but neither can it be purely biological. Human neurosis has a significance which permeates the biological, the psycho-physical, and the spiritual levels, and which must be acknowledged on all these levels."²

For Jung, therefore, the essential factor of neurosis is not the existence of a highly charged emotion but dissociation. He sees in conflict and dissociation of personality the real basis for neurosis; this dissociation arises from the conscious attitude and the trend of the unconscious, which are sometimes opposites.

1. *Coll. Works*, XVI, 76-77. Cf. XI, 300, 328-331.

2. Igor Caruso, *Existential Psychology*, p. 68.